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Budgetary Consequences of Defense 
Expenditures in Pakistan: Short-Run Impacts and 
Long-Run Adjustments* 
PETER C. FREDERIKSEN & ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
In the last twenty years, there has been a growing interest in quantifying the 'guns versus butter' tradeoff 
facing developing countries. This article examines Pakistan's military expenditures between 1973 and 
1986 and estimates ·both a short-run impact model and long-run adjustment model to measure how 
changes in the defense burden, the deficit, and government debt have affected budget allocations to 
economic services programs and administrative/social programs. In addition, we investigate whether 
defense budgets have been increased or maintained either at the expense of economic and social 
programs in general or merely confined to one or two specific programs. Military expenditure patterns 
are analyzed to see whether or not they were responsible for across-the-board cuts in long-term 
infrastructure programs. Our analysis indicates that the deficit, the debt service, and the military burden 
are often interrelated in such a compleic manner that the impact of any specific program is difficult to 
predict. In the short run, most infrastructure programs increased as the military burden declined. The 
opposite was generally true for social programs such as social security, welfare, and housing. Changes in 
the defense budget appear to have only a transitory effect on the share of government expenditures 
allocated toward infrastructure. The long-run model suggests that social programs have just as high a 
priority as economic services. When the military burden increases, the government is willing to take 
some resources from infrastructure programs and lets the deficit grow to finance social programs. Our 
results also suggest a long run pattern of adjustment in social programs but not infrastructure programs -
a counter-intuitive result given Pakistan's severe infrastructure constraints. 
1. Introduction 
Toward the end of 1988, a deteriorating 
resource situation in Pakistan resulted in a 
financial crisis. The budget deficit had 
reached 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), inflation accelerated, and the cur-
rent account deficit had doubled to 4.3% of 
Gross National Product (GNP). In addition, 
the external debt service ratio was approxi-
mately 28% of export earnings and foreign 
exchange reserves were cut in half to USO 
438 million, an amount equal to under three 
weeks of imports (World Bank, 1991). This 
deteriorating economic situation forced the 
government of Pakistan to enter into several 
agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and several bilateral 
donors to implement a medium-term adjust-
• The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments 
made by Nils Petter Gleditsch, Editor of IPR, and two 
anonymous referees. The opinions expressed here are 
not necessarily those of the US Government or the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
ment and structural reform program aimed 
at restoring resource balances to sustainable 
levels and improving the economy's effic-
iency. 
In large part, Pakistan's fiscal problems 
can be attributed to two basic constraints: a 
narrow tax base and the majority of current 
expenditures budgeted to military expendi-
tures and debt-servicing, programs which 
have steadily grown over time. Jointly, 
these two programs account for over 81 % of 
the 1990/91 budget. The Annual Develop-
ment Plan often must be revised downward 
following cuts in foreign aid and local 
resources (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1991). 
This article examines Pakistan's military 
~xpenditures between 1973 and 1986 and 
presents short-run impact and long-run 
adjustment models to measure how changes 
in the defense burden have affected budget 
allocations to (a) economic services pro-
grams (including infrastructure and trans-
portation) and administrative/social pro-
grams. In addition, we are interested in 
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whether defense budgets have been 
increased or maintained either at the 
expense of economic and social programs in 
general or confined to one specific area. 
Finally, we examine military expenditure 
patterns to see if they were responsible (if at 
all) for across-the-board cuts in long-term 
infrastructure programs such as transport, 
communications, and energy programs, or 
whether the reductions were concentrated 
in any specific program. 
2. Review of the Literature 
In the last twenty years, interest has focused 
on the 'guns versus butter' tradeoff facing 
developing countries. Researchers have 
tried to quantify the determinants of 
government programs and the tradeoffs be-
tween the programs. Much of the recent 
work has focused on education and defense, 
since these represent the two largest budget 
categories for most countries. 
Heller & Cheasty (1983) examined data 
on 27 middle-income countries 1 and 
measured changes in education expendi-
tures when budgets were cut between 1965 
and 1978. Education expenditures averaged 
approximately 16% of central government 
expenditures. While they had expected to 
find that education was fairly elastic with 
respect to central budget changes, they 
found instead 'resilience' in education 
expenditures. The authors attributed this 
inelasticity to high political, social, and 
economic priorities afforded education. 
However, they pointed out that just examin-
ing simple educational expenditure GDP 
ratios tended to mask the ways individual 
countries handled inflation and budget cuts. 
Enrollments expanded (especially in 
secondary. and tertiary levels) concomitant 
with a sharp drop in expenditure per 
student, and recently completed capital 
projects were significantly underfinanced. • 
The authors did find a high priority placed 
on primary education - larger enrollments 
were accompanied by increased real expen-
ditures per student. 
In the same year, Hicks & Kubisch (1983) 
noted that little was known about (a) how 
governments increase or decrease public 
sector expenditures, or (b) whether some 
sectors are more vulnerable than others in 
turbulent economic conditions. In a short 
run austerity framework, they isolated 32 
countries (excluding Pakistan) where total 
real government expenditures had declined 
in more than one year between 1972 and 
1980. They calculated real percentage 
changes for each sector and for all govern-
ment expenditures. The two measures were 
compared to measure the 'vulnerability' of 
the sector. On average, total government 
expenditures declined 13% while social 
sectors and defense and administration de-
clined 5% and 8% respectively, i.e. were 
relatively protected. The' productive sectors 
(agriculture, mining, forestry, fishing, etc.) 
and infrastructure programs were much 
more vulnerable and were cut 15 and 20% 
respectively. Hicks & Kubisch concluded 
that program cuts are not 'across-the-
board'; well-protected programs appear to 
be those which are politically sensitive in 
terms of jobs. Furthermore, they suggested 
that countries forgo future consumption for 
present consumption by either abolishing or 
reducing subsidies to long-term infrastruc-
ture projects. 
Deger (1985) used data on 50 countries to 
examine the tradeoff between education 
and defense. Using a simultaneous equation 
model, she estimated that if the allocation to 
defense were cut by 15% (approximately 
USD 13 billion), there would be an increase 
of 2.9% (approximately USD 4.5 billion) in 
the allocation to education. She also de-
scribed some of the specific human resource 
projects which could likely be obtained with 
the reduction in defense. Looney (1986) 
examined several Latin American countries 
and estimated a model (using regression 
analysis) where non-defense sectors as a 
percent of central government expenditures 
(CGE) depend on the allocation to defense 
and also the ratio of CGE/GNP. He noted 
that changes in non-defense were not just a 
function of changes in defense, but also the 
size of the budget in relation to the country's 
GNP. Looney found a negative tradeoff be-
tween defense and other government expen-
ditures for one group of countries and a 
positive tradeoff for another group of coun-
tries. He explained the latter result - simul-
taneous increases in both defense and social 
programs - as a result of either the civilian 
sector increasing allocations to defense to 
keep them out of power, or because large 
capital expenditures in the military (often 
financed by the US) are immune to short-
term cutbacks. He also suggests that '. . . 
defense and social programs may rise 
together because both are supported by 
relatively powerful constituencies' (p. 98). 
In 1988, Harris et al. (1988) built on the 
earlier work by Hicks &·Kubisch and tested 
for the existence (and strength) of a tradeoff 
between defense and education or health. 
Their results did not support the conven-
tional view of a tradeoff. Countries with 
high defense expenditures did not routinely 
exhibit low education/health expenditures 
(and vice versa). In addition, defense was 
no less vulnerable to budget cuts, nor more 
likely to gain from budget increases than 
education and health. When the central 
budget expands, defense expenditures in-
crease at the same rate as education expen-
ditures in lower income countries; in middle 
income countries, health expenditures rose 
more rapidly than defense or education. 
While the main focus of Hess & Mullman 
(1988) was on the determinants of military 
expenditures, they also examined the 
defense/education tradeoff. They found no 
evidence of any substitution between public 
education and the military. While Pakistan 
was included in the study, the authors were 
cautious about the results, since the study 
was based on data for 1982 and 1983 only. 
They did not examine the vulnerability of 
defense as budgets decline, or discuss fund-
ing sources except for GNP and net foreign 
aid. 
In one of the few studies which examined 
instances where the budget has both 
increased and decreased, De Masi & Lorie 
(1989) examined the effect of fiscal 
tightening and fiscal accommodation under 
IMF-supported programs in developing 
countries. They found that under fiscal-
tightening conditions, the proportion of 
military spending to GDP decreased, but 
the proportion of military expenditures to 
total government expenditures increased, 
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suggesting that 'military expenditures tend 
to be "resilient" to the budgetary adjust-
ments that needed to be made' (p. 132). On 
the other hand, under fiscal accommodation 
by the Fund, as total government expendi-
tures increase, the resources allocated to 
defense decline. 
Hewitt (1991a) examined defense trends, 
compared military expenditures, and dis-
cussed the impact of defense expenditures 
on development for 125 developing coun-
tries between 1972 and 1988. In addition, he 
analyzed the budgetary tradeoff between 
military, social and development expendi-
tures for a smaller sample of 51 countries 
between 1975 and 1987. 'He found that 
central government expenditures as a pro-
portion of GDP rose to accommodate. 
higher interest costs; at the same time, mili-
tary expenditures and expenditures on econ-
omic services were reduced by 23% and 
17% respectively. At the same time, expen-
ditures on social services were insulated -
remaining the same or increasing in 35 of 
the countries examined. Hewitt concluded 
from this study and an econometric study of 
the determinants of military expenditures 
(1991b) that the elasticity of military expen-
ditures with respect to the central govern-
ment budget was 0.75. In addition, foreign 
financial assistance seems to be a major 
determinant of military expenditures and 
the central budget expands to accommodate 
the higher defense spending. 
3. Extended Models of Program Shares 
This section describes two extended models 
developed to help explain program share. 
The first model tests for short-run impacts 
on program shares, while the second model 
tests for long-run adjustments in program 
share. The short-run impact model and the 
long-run adjustment model are both esti-
mated for Pakistan using IMF data for the 
period 1973 to 1986.2 
3.1 Short-Run Model 
Our short-run model extends the Hicks/ 
Kubisch type short-run austerity models by 
including two financial variables. While a 
change in program might reflect a direct 
14 Peter C. Frederiksen & Robert E. Looney 
Table I. Short-Run Model Results, Economic Budgetary Categories, Pakistan 1973-86 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Budget Category DEFCIT,_ 1 
Total Economic Services 0.14 
Agriculture i.05•• 
Mining 0.19 







Other Expenditures 0.10 
• Significant at the 5% level; •• significant at the 1 % level 
tradeoff with another program - per the 
Hicks/Kubisch approach - the change may 
instead reflect either the government's will-
ingness to increase the deficit to fund the 
program or an increased level of govern-
ment borrowing from abroad. Thus, an 
apparent tradeoff might in fact be spurious 
and reflect the willingness of the govern-
ment to fund one program and not the 
other. Our short-run impact model de-
scribes shares allocated to different· pro-
grams and includes sectoral priorities as well 
as the government deficit and government 
debt. 
Operationally, the model has been esti-
mated in linear form as follows: 
(1) SHARE;,,= aDEFCIT,_ 1 + 
bMILEXP, + cGOVDEBT, + e 
where SHARE;, 1 is the share of ith program 
in time period t, DEFCIT,_ 1 is the govern-
ment deficit lagged one year, 3 MILEXP, is 
defense expenditures as percent of total 
government expenditures (the military 
burden) in year t, GOVDEBT, is the gov-
ernment debt as a percent of the GDP in 
year t, and e is the error term. The militarye 
burden variable has been included to rep-
resent the guns versus butter analogy as de-
scribed in the Hicks/Kubisch type model. 
While the amount going to various pro-
grams other than defense could explain sec-
toral priorities, the military budget (both in 
size and growth) is in our opinion the most 
MILEXP, GOVDEBT, Ri 
-1.12•• 
-0.32* 0.73 
0.30** -0.15• 0.97 
-0.81 •• -0.36 0.42 
-0.76** -0.02 0.73 
-0.15•• 0.41* 0.80 
-0.13 0.59** 0.78 
-i.01 •• -0.68** 0.42 
-0.19 0.48* 0.45 
-0.02 0.52•• 0.80 
0.11 -0.86** 0.87 
-0.59 -0.18 0.32 
significant variable affecting sectoral pri-
orities. 
The hypothesized signs of the estimated 
coefficients in the short-run impact model 
are either positive or negative. For example, 
the deficit could be increased to fund a pro-
gram depending on the program's priority. 
Similarly, the government could increase 
the debt to finance a particular program. On 
the other hand, a higher debt might discour-
age the government from committing ad-
ditional expenditures to a . particular pro-
gram. 
Equation (1) was estimated for Pakistan 
for the period 1973 to 1986 for all economic 
budgetary categories (Table I) and all ad-
ministrative/social budgetary categories 
(Table 11).4 The results produced several 
distinct impact patterns. Total economic 
services were adversely affected by both 
military expenditures and government debt, 
but were not impacted by the government's 
fiscal position. However, there was great 
diversity when the various economic ser-
vices were examined separately. The shares 
going to agriculture and the military were 
complementary, whereas the shares to min-
ing and other economic services declined as 
the military budget grew. While increases in 
the government debt retarded all the econ-
omic service categories, the estimated coef-
ficient was statistically significant for only 
agriculture. The share to agriculture was 
also positively associated with the size of the 
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Table II. Short-Run Model Results, Administrative/Social Budgetary Categories, Pakistan 1973-86 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Budget Category DEFCIT,_1 
Public Services 0.90** 
Total Education -0.68* 
Primary/Secondary Education -0.63* 
Tertiary Education -1.07** 




Other Health 0.89** 
Social Security/Welfare -0.95** 
Social Security 0.65 
Welfare -0.95** 
Housing 0.86** 
Recreation/Religious Activity 0.09 
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1 % level 
deficit. Of the infrastructure programs, only 
communications seems to have been ad-
versely affected by the military budget. 
With the exception of communications and 
energy, infrastructure programs seems to 
have expanded through government in-
debtedness. Transportation programs 
(roads and railroads) and energy expanded 
as the deficit increased. 
In general, the results from Table I indi-
cate a possible conflict in government pri-
orities. On the one hand, economic activi-
ties generally have been a lower priority 
than military expenditures. On the other 
hand, the government appeared willing to 
offset this bias - especially against infra-
structure programs - by increasing its over-
all debt burden. 
A much different pattern emerged with 
the administrative/social budget categories 
(Table II). Education and health programs 
were not affected by the military burden. 
However, public services, social security/ 
welfare, and recreation/religious program 
shares rose with the defense budget. The 
government did not increase its debt to fund 
education nor has the debt burden resulted 
in austerity cuts in the schools. There is 
some evidence to suggest a low priority 
afforded education since education and the 
deficit are negatively associated. Austerity 
MILEXP, GOVDEBT, Ri 
0.59** -0.18 0.68 
-0.10 -0.06* 0.10 
-0.26 -0.15 0.57 
-0.12 -0.10 0.77 
0.16 0.12 0.51 
-0.08 -0.57** 0.88 
-0.36 -0.26 0.29 
-0.32 -0.21 0.32 
0.01 -0.44* 0.79 
0.31 0.30 0.80 
0.87* 0.22 0.39 
0.31 0.3(), 0.80 
0.54** 0.39* 0.75 
0.73* -0.29 0.31 
stemming from larger deficits has been con-
centrated in educational programs (es-
pecially tertiary). By and large, health 
received a high budget priority although this 
was largely limited to 'other health' - expen-
ditures not associated with hospitals or 
clinics. One of the government's responses 
to rising debt burdens was to constrain allo-
cations to the health sector. 
The administrative/social sectors appear 
to fall under a different set of budgetary 
rules than the economic sectors, particularly 
infrastructure. While the economic activities 
clearly have a lower priority than the mili-
tary, several of the social sectors appear to 
be complementary to defense - their allo-
cations expanding and contracting with simi-
lar changes in defense. The government 
does not appear to be willing to accrue sig-
nificantly higher levels of debt to maintain 
the shares of these sectors. 
3.2 Long-Run Model 
While the results obtained above are inter-
esting, the long-run budgetary adjustments 
stemming from a change in the deficit or 
military burden may also be considered. 
This section expands the Hess/Mullman 
model and presents a model which includes 
the long-run adjustments to program shares. 
The short-run model considered the im-
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Table III. Long-Run Model Results, Economic Budgetary Categories, Pakistan 1973-86 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Budget Category SHARE,_ 1 
Total Economic Services 0.49** 
Agriculture 0.87* 
Mining 0.39 







Other Expenditures -0.03 
* Significant at the 5% level; •• significant at the 1 % level 
mediate impact on a program as the deficit 
or military burden changed. As was seen, 
the share rose or fell depending on the type 
of program. In the long run, it is possible 
that the government may look to entirely 
different programs to absorb the impact of 
the change in the deficit or military expendi-
tures. For example, the government may 
find it easier to cut from an education pro-
gram in the short-run but from an infrastruc-
ture program in the long-run. While the im-
mediate short-run impact is destabilizing, 
the medium or long-run goal is to restore 
optimal budget composition. In addition, it 
is likely that this attempt to restore the opti-
mal budget composition cannot be com-
pleted in one year. Thus we hypothesize 
that budget allocations to a particular pro-
gram in Pakistan adjust over time to bridge 
the gap between what the .country considers 
optimal and the level which exists at any 
point in time. Obviously the factors which 
determine the optimal level will vary from 
program to program. For infrastructure pro-
grams the level may be based on economic 
activity, while for education it may be an. 
international comparison of literacy for 
example. 
Operationally, these factors can be 
included by estimating a Koyck (1954) dis-
tributed lag model, which involves introduc-
ing the lagged value of the respective 
budgetary share as an independent variable. 
DEFCIT, MILEXP, R2 
0.29•• -0.78** 0.78 
0.08 0.32 0.73 
0.21 -0.60 0.21 
-0.64* -0.60** 0.76 
0.23 -0.98** 0.61 
0.86* -0.54 0.44 
0.46 -0.35 0.56 
0.63** -0.51* 0.51 
0.99** -0.54* 0.80 
0.23 0.35* 0.44 
0.21 -0.49 0.52 
The long-run adjustment model is estimated 
in the following form: 
(2) SHARE;,1 = aSHARE,_ 1 + 
bDEFCIT, + cMILEXP, + E 
In this form, the share allocated to a particu-
lar program in time period t depends on the 
amount allocated in the previous time 
period (t-1). The allocation in period t indi-
cates the speed at which the government 
wants to bridge the gap between actual and 
the long-run desired program composition. 
The speed at which the gap closes also 
depends on the budget process, budgetary 
constraints and the pre-emption of funds by 
the military. In this structural form, as the 
government deficit increases for example, 
the effect on budgetary share will have an 
immediate impact and also an impact dis-
tributed over time. Thus the effect of 
reduced resource availability is not only 
year-to-year but may be spread out and 
'decays' over time. 
Equation (2) was estimated for the same 
budget categories as the short-run model 
and the results appear as Tables III and IV. 
While the patterns are not as clear for this 
model as for the short-run model, several 
trends stand out. For most of the economic 
budget categories the estimated coefficient 
for SHARE,_ 1 was not statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that at least for Pakistan 
most of the program adjustment takes place 
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Table IV. Long-Run Model Results, Administrative/Social Budgetary Categories, Pakistan 1973-86 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Budget Category SHARE,_ 1 DEFCIT, MILEXP, Ri 
Public Services 0.54* 0.36 0.39* 0.75 
Total Education 0.65 -0.26 0.17 0.09 
Primary/Secondary Education 0.98* -0.03 -0.04 0.45 
Tertiary Education 0.57** -0.52 .. -0.06 0.96 
Other Education -0.70** 0.71** -0.26 0.73 
Health 0.74** 0.30 0.()9 0.52 
Hospitals 0.18 -0.33 -0.29 
Clinics -0.06 -o·.13•• -0.13 0.48 
Other Health 0.67* 0.30 om 0.46 
Social Security/Welfare 0.65** -0.48** 0.42** 0.91 
Social Security 1.09** 0.04 0.70* 0.27 
Welfare 0.66** -0.46** 0.3~· 0.88 
Housing -0.13 0.99** 0.11 0.80 
Recreation/Religious Activity -0.19 -0.63* 0.69** 0.70 
* Significant at the 5% level; * • significant at the .I% level 
in the short run and not the long run. The 
opposite was true only for total economic 
services and agriculture. For the economic 
budgetary categories except energy, the 
results suggest a strong tradeoff between 
defense expenditures and program share. 
For total economic services, transportation, 
roads and railroads, the negative effect of a 
larger military burden was partially offset by 
a willingness to run a higher deficit to fund 
the program. Most programs in Pakistan 
(especially infrastructure) have a much 
lower priority than defense, but the govern-
ment apparently is unwilling to further 
reduce allocations to these programs as part 
of a general austerity program. 
The pattern for the administrative and 
social expenditure programs (Table IV) is 
quite different. Since the estimated coef-
ficient for the lagged SHARE variable was 
statistically significant for many of the pro-
grams, we conclude that adjustment to 
changes in the deficit or military burden 
does take place over the longer-run period. 
This indicates that the government of 
Pakistan is concerned about restoring some 
sense of balance in social programs. This is 
particularly striking, as one would have 
expected this to be the case for infrastruc-
ture programs (which are stretched out over 
time) rather than social programs. The mili-
tary burden has little impact on program 
share. If significant, program share was 
complementary to the military burden - a 
result also obtained in the short-run model. 
In addition, the results suggest that the 
government is unwilling to run higher defi-
cits to fund these programs. In fact, the 
opposite tended to be true, administrative 
and budgetary programs were somewhat 
vulnerable over time to larger deficits. 
4. Conclusions 
Despite an annual growth rate of 6.5% 
during the 1980s, the economy of Pakistan 
showed a number of structural problems. 
These included a weak public resource pos-
ition, high consumption expenditures (par-
ticularly in defense) which resulted in 
excessive deficits, and a growing debt ser-
vice burden stemming from large amounts 
of external borrowing. 
This article has presented a short-run 
.impact model and also a longer-run adjust-
ment model. The analysis has indicated that 
the deficit, the debt service, and the military 
burden are often interrelated in a complex 
manner, such that their impact on any 
specific government program is difficult to 
pred:ct. In the short run, most infrastructure 
programs increased as the military burden 
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declined. However, the opposite seemed to 
be true for social programs (social security, 
welfare, and housing). Changes in the 
defense budget appear to have only a transi-
tory effect on the share of government 
expenditures allocated towards physical 
capital formation. Instead, the willingness 
(and ability) of the government to borrow 
largely determines the share of the nation's 
resources to infrastructure investments. 
Our adjustment model suggests that 
social programs have just as high a priority 
(or even higher) than economic services. 
When the military burden increases, the 
government is willing to take the resources 
from infrastructure programs. Instead of 
canceling social programs the government 
appears willing to Jet the deficit grow. In 
addition, our results suggest a Jong-run pat-
tern of adjustment in social programs but 
not in infrastructure programs - a counter-
intuitive result which warrants further 
research in light of Pakistan's severe infra-
structure constraints. 
NOTES 
1. Eighteen countries were from Latin America and 
nine (including Pakistan) were from elsewhere. 
2. The period for which consistent data are available. 
Budgetary data are from IMF. Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook (various issues): economic and 
debt data are from IMF, International Financial Stat-
istics Yearbook (1990). 
3. The deficit is lagged to one year, since we assume 
that the current deficit (in year 1) will not be known 
with enough certainty to affect current expendi-
tures. 
4. Only the standardized regression coefficients have 
been reported. The I-statistics are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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